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September 11 and the subsequent wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the
current fight against Al Qaeda and ISIS.
One of the great strengths of this book is
the way Bacevich brings all these events
together in sufficient detail to enable
the reader to take in “the whole picture.”
It allows one to put these events into
greater context and see the patterns that
have developed. In short, it performs
a very complete assessment of where
we have been, what assumptions the
leaders of the United States have made,
what policy decisions were made on the
basis of those assumptions, and what
the outcomes have been to this time.
Toward the book’s end, Bacevich asks
two very pointed questions. First, why
“has the world’s mightiest military
achieved so little even while itself
absorbing very considerable losses and
inflicting even greater damage on the
subjects of America’s supposed beneficence?” Second, why, “in the face of
such unsatisfactory outcomes[,] has the
United States refused to chart a different
course?” Bacevich goes on to offer what
he believes are the answers to these
questions, then ends by arguing that, in
light of new technology that allows more
oil reserves to become accessible in the
Western Hemisphere, the United States
would be better served by securing
its “own neighborhood rather than
vainly attempting to police the Greater
Middle East.” The question that comes to
mind—one with which I’m sure our national leaders wrestle—is this: What will
happen to this region, and subsequently
the world, if the United States stops its
involvement in the Greater Middle East?
This well-researched book is a mustread for all of us who study, plan, and
execute the military arm of national
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power—and especially for those who
make decisions about national policy.
ROGER DUCEY

Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War,
ed. Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins.
Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press,
2015. 486 pages. $21.95.

Augmenting the literature of firsthand
accounts by senior leaders such as
General Stanley McChrystal and
Ambassador Christopher Hill, National
Defense University faculty members
Richard Hooker and Joseph Collins
assembled a strong team to make sense
of the last fifteen years of war. The editors appreciate the challenges of writing
current history, but offer the book as “an
assessment of two unfinished campaigns, written for future senior officers,
their key advisors, and other national
security professionals.” With more than
three million U.S. and coalition veterans
of Iraq and Afghanistan, few undertakings are more important. Veterans of
today will shape the future of defense
over the next twenty years, just as their
forebears, such as Anthony Zinni, Colin
Powell, and Richard Holbrooke, were
shaped by their Vietnam experiences.
The chapters are at their best when
they leverage insights from both senior
military and civilian leaders to reach
important conclusions, such as the
following: “Civilian national security decisionmakers need a better understanding of the complexity of military strategy
and the military’s need for planning
guidance. Senior military officers for
their part require a deep understanding
of the interagency decisionmaking
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process, an appreciation for the perspectives and frames of reference of civilian
counterparts, and a willingness to
embrace and not resist the complexities
and challenges inherent in the system of
civilian control” (p. 71). On this point,
it would be important to learn from the
productive relationships of Lieutenant
General David Barno and Ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad in Kabul during 2003,
and General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Baghdad during
2007. The editors capture the important
civil-military relations discussion in
their conclusion, writing that “there is
no ‘purely military’ question . . . [yet the
advice of senior military personnel as
experts] was not used in full” (p. 407).
The book raises—and sometimes challenges—persistent myths, such as the
belief that the presence of an additional
battalion at Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in
2001 would have enabled the capture
of Osama Bin Laden. Others addressed
include the belief that Kabul could have
stood on its own in the early part of last
decade, and that a post-Saddam Iraq
would be lawless. Further, the book
reminds us that these two wars did not
begin as insurgencies; that military
gains were disconnected from political
goals; and that the U.S. government has
neither the capacity nor the disposition
to promote political and economic
development on par with its capacity to
develop foreign military forces. Neither
U.S. presidential administration could
agree on the scope of the problem
nor could either generate the unity
of effort that we see—in hindsight—
would have been needed to stabilize
either country. Consequently, the
United States abandoned its grandiose
national objectives and shifted
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its emphasis to training Iraqis and
Afghans to fight their own civil wars.
Among the volume’s contributors and
chapters, the reviewer particularly
notes the following:

• Thomas X. Hammes explores well the

challenges of security force assistance,
concluding that “the personnel system
never really adjusted . . . [and advisers
and trainers were] working against
incredible handicaps” (p. 335).

• Collins’s chapter on initial planning

for the wars lays out the assumptions made and the ill-conceived
expectations that developed. At times
he reconciles Beltway and theater
perspectives; for instance, “DOD
civilian leadership did not want to
admit—perhaps for public relations or
legal reasons—that by mid-summer
2003, there was an insurgency going
on” (p. 65).

• Frank G. Hoffman and G. Alexander

Crowther follow with an important
assessment of the Iraq and Afghan
surges, providing a rich narrative that
illustrates strategic adaptation. They
conclude that “war is an audit of how
well states have formulated policies
and strategies, and how well prepared
their armed forces and other tools are”
(p. 146).

• To examine the political context of

strategy formulation during the wars,
the chapter by Christopher J. Lamb
and Megan Franco analyzes senior
leaders’ decisions. The authors “conclude that critical strategy handicaps,
insufficient unity of effort, and, to a
lesser extent, missing or late-to-need
capabilities for irregular warfighting
offer a compelling explanation for
why the United States was not able to
fully achieve its goals in Afghanistan
and Iraq” (p. 168).

• Nicholas Rostow and Harvey

Rishikof identify legal lessons from
the wars, noting that “lawyers should
be regarded as essential participants in
the planning process” (p. 378).
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To be sure, there are limits to how
much we should draw from these two
conflicts, especially since they have not
ended yet. Furthermore, the editors
acknowledge that whatever lessons
might be learned will not necessarily
prevent future failures. While the two
conflicts are linked temporally, differing
rationales for beginning them, different presidential administrations, and
different adversaries limit the value of
larger comparisons. Inputs from our
allies and erstwhile partners—absent
here—also would be beneficial to
study. Yet the book is rich in detail and
analysis, all underscoring the lesson of
a decade-plus: that, while the United
States might be able to support and
enable its international partners, it
cannot solve all their problems by itself.
DEREK S. REVERON

Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective, ed. Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Peter
Dombrowski. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press,
2015. 328 pages. $29.95.

As a collective voice on the topic,
Regional Missile Defense from a Global
Perspective offers a comprehensive
discussion of the history, development,
and present state of ballistic missile
defense (BMD), infused with a distinctive blend of technical aspects and
analysis of the geopolitical forces that
shaped it. Using the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
as an initial framework for discussion,
the works of several notable experts
in the fields of international studies,
nuclear policy, national defense,
foreign affairs, and political science are
combined to yield a nuanced overview
of the subject, expertly delineating the
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parallel development of technological
advances and ongoing political realities
for participating nations. Threaded
throughout the book are significant
discussions on the implications of a
regionally based missile-defense system
having more than just a regional impact.
On the basis of operational concepts
developed to protect London from
V-2 rockets during World War II,
U.S. efforts initially were envisioned
to protect select cities from Soviet or
Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) attacks. When this proved to be
technically and financially prohibitive,
scaled-back systems designed primarily
to defend ICBM sites and their capabilities for strategic offensive operations
were constructed. Arms-limitation
talks between the superpowers during
the early seventies further reduced
the scope of this capability. However,
because of President Reagan’s concern
during his presidency about the lack of
an effective BMD for the country and
his preference for a strategic alternative
to mutually assured destruction, SDI
was developed. With the overall goal of
eliminating the threat posed by Soviet
ICBMs, all aspects of ongoing research
were combined under one program.
This point in history is the starting point
for the book; from there it begins to
construct the foundation for an examination of the technological challenges of
developing a missile defense and the political realities these developments foster.
Part 1, “U.S. Policies and Programs”
(p. 17), starts with an examination of
BMD policies as they evolved during the
Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill
Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations and some of the documents
that defined the actual threat, examined
technical controversies, and captured
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